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In past decades, many empirical studies revealed return anomalies in many different 
asset classes and markets. Very recent publications have, however, even found 
evidence that stock markets react to the results of soccer matches. 
In this paper, we argue that such empirical studies should be analyzed carefully; we 
thus endorse the use of replication studies to verify results. Consequently, by 
rebuilding the study of Ashton et al. (2003), we are able to detect mistakes in the 
empirical set-up. Based on these findings, we demonstrate how even minor flaws can 
have a crucial influence on the results of such studies and point out pitfalls that are 
frequently encountered. We furthermore emphasize the importance of robustness 
checks to validate the results of empirical studies. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, empirical researchers have put much effort into uncovering stock 
market anomalies. The results often violate the traditional efficient market hypothesis 
and sometimes result in the mistrust of traditional asset-pricing models. Today, we 
believe that many irrational aspects do indeed play a role in the formation of returns: 
daily stock returns are, for example, correlated with sunshine (see Hirshleifer and 
Shumway, 2003), daylight saving changes (see Kamstra et al., 2000), and sporting 
events. Edmans et al. (2007) demonstrate a significant relation between soccer match 
results and stock returns. They also document a loss effect after other international 
sports events like cricket, rugby, and basketball games. The authors argue that the 
literature on psychology indicates that sport results have a significant effect on 
investors’ mood in general. 
In their study on the influence that the performance of England’s national soccer 
team has on the British FTSE 100 index, Ashton et al. (2003) find a statistically 
significant relationship. For these authors, the economic importance of sport events is 
the rationale for stock markets reacting to a soccer team’s performance.  
The “soccer industry” indubitably plays an important economic role. The World Cup 
2006 in Germany exemplified this when approximately 4 million fans came from 
abroad to support their teams. FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association), the international governing body of the soccer association, generated 
total revenues of CHF 2.858 billion ($ 2.594 billion) with this World Cup. Could this 
have had an impact on the stock market? Since FIFA is neither capital market 
oriented, nor listed, we assume that in terms of GDP, the role of the “soccer 
industry” is not a significant one at all.  
Page 3 of 22
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 4 
In terms of psychological factors, the assumption that the outcome of a soccer game 
does have an influence on the stock market the day following the match is very 
unlikely as well – however compelling the argument might look at first glance. This 
is exemplified, for example, by Germany’s defeat by Italy in the 2006 World Cup 
semifinal. This was a shock for Germans (and, of course, for German shareholders); 
nevertheless, the World Cup event still had an overall positive effect on the German 
economy. Furthermore, a large portion of the German DAX free float is traded by 
foreign investors who were arguably not interested in the outcome of that game (they 
might even have been Italians!). Was there therefore a rationale for the DAX index to 
reflect the outcome of this game? 
We replicated the study by Ashton et al. (2003) and were able to detect several 
inconsistencies in their event study set-up. Based on these findings, we present 
typical mistakes found in such empirical studies, especially in event studies, which 
are extremely susceptible to errors and assumptions. These errors should be avoided, 
as even small variances in the measuring of an event can influence the results 
strongly.  
Our aim with this paper is to encourage the utilization of replication studies.1 We 
want to stress the importance of publishing empirical papers that do not find 
statistically significant results (especially when studying topics related to market 
efficiency, see, e.g., Fama, 1970, 1991).   
The outline of this paper is as follows: in the next section we demonstrate, by means 
of a replication study, that the original study by Ashton et al. (2003) contains several 
basic mistakes and could lead to quite different results. Section 3 applies robustness 
checks to the corrected results and the last section summarizes our findings and 
concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1
 On the importance of replication studies see Hubbard and Vetter (1996) 
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2 Replication of the Study by Ashton et al. (2003) 
In their empirical study, which covers the period January 6, 1984 to July 3, 2002, 
Ashton et al. (2003) find a strong link between the performance of England’s 
national soccer team and daily changes on the London Stock Exchange’s FTSE 100 
index. The authors arrive at this finding after performing an event study analysis of 
the London Stock Exchange’s stock index movements following international 
matches played by the national soccer team. In conclusion, they use a binomial test 
to check whether the return of the trading day following a soccer game differs from 
the unconditional mean return of all other trading days. 
We rebuilt the above-mentioned study in respect of the same time period, with daily 
prices sourced from Datastream and soccer game results from various media. We 
subsequently arrived at results that differed from the ones reported by Ashton et al. 
(2003). In order to explain this divergence, we studied possible distortions in event 
studies in greater depth. By not correcting them, we were able to reproduce some of 
the results produced by Ashton et al. (2003). The differences between our (corrected) 
results and those of Asthon et al. (2003) are noteworthy.   
 
2.1 Holiday Return Effect 
Ashton et al. (2003) used Datastream as the source of their capital market data. 
Generally, the data quality is very good, but there is one problem: Datastream always 
reports the last price if there has been no trading on a holiday. This effect produces a 
zero return for every holiday within the data series, which can seriously distort an 
empirical investigation if this effect is not corrected. A possible solution is to use 
Datastream’s holiday function, which shows a price of “#NA” for holidays when the 
data file is downloaded. Another solution is to select all returns with a zero size and 
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check them against a calendar, removing them if they fell on holidays. Checking 
against a calendar is crucial because it is also possible, although not very likely, that 
two real closing prices could be identical. The latter could occur since, for example, 
genuine zero returns were not all that uncommon in the early days of the FTSE 100 
index when its level was not particularly high.  
It is definitely a grave mistake not to correct zero returns in the data set. When using 
the data of final match days, we were closer to the results provided by Ashton et al. 
(2003) than when we did correct zero returns on holidays. This affected, for example, 
the data regarding the game played on Sunday, June 2, 2002 (World Cup, England 
vs. Sweden). The following two weekdays were public holidays: on June 3, the 
Queen’s Golden Jubilee was celebrated and June 4 was the spring bank holiday. 
Ashton et al. (2003) apparently used a zero return to compute the abnormal return for 
this final game, as our results converged with theirs when we did the same. We 
thereafter checked other pitfalls and were able to replicate more of their results. 
 
2.2 The “Copy and Paste” Effect 
Ashton et al. (2003) report that within the study period, England’s national soccer 
team participated in 35 “tournament final games” of which they won 12 games, lost 
12, and drew 11. This information is not actually correct, but by accessing the 
national soccer team’s official homepage and doing a “copy and paste” of the 
“fixtures and results,” it was possible to replicate the above results. The correct 
distribution of the 35 “tournament finals games” was, however, 13 wins, 14 losses, 
and 8 draws. There is, however, a further problem: the list of games within the study 
period ends with a semi-final at Wembley Stadium on June 26, 1996, which resulted 
in a draw (1:1). This is, of course, not possible in a semi-final. The game was won 
6:5 by Germany after a penalty shootout and indicated as such in the list by an 
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asterisk, which could be overlooked when “copying and pasting.” The impact on the 
results is, however, enormous. Since Ashton and his colleagues argue that there is a 
“feel-good factor,” it should, in this case, have been quite low as the national team 
had lost a semi-final. However, it is quite obvious that all the errors made had a 
strong influence on the empirical analysis results. 
 
2.3 The Globalization Effect 
In every event study, the point in time is of extraordinary importance when 
measuring the event’s impact on stock returns. Efficient markets will immediately 
reflect the effect of the event in the stock prices (MacKinlay, 1997). The London 
Stock Exchange does not trade around the clock; consequently, if the result of a 
soccer game is known before 4.30 pm BST on the day, this result will be reflected in 
that day’s closing price, otherwise in the next trading day’s closing price. It is 
therefore important to identify the exact time of the event to group it accordingly. In 
their article, Ashton et al. (2003) mention that they always used the return of the 
trading day following the soccer game. In general, this procedure cannot be 
criticized, because the majority of soccer gam s in Europe (with only a few 
exceptions) are decided after stock exchange trading hours. An exception would be 
the World Cup 2002 hosted by Japan and South Korea. The time difference between 
the UK and Japan is +8 hours. During this World Cup, some kick-offs took place 
during the evening, which was around midday British time. Consequently, the results 
were known on the day of the soccer game and were already digested in the day’s 
closing price. Any measurement of the effect of the match result on the next trading 
day would therefore distort the results. It is, however, possible to argue against our 
assertion. Without using market microstructure data, it is indeed difficult to assess 
the effects of these games in an entirely undistorted way. 
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2.4 The Correct(ed) Outcomes 
By including the aforementioned errors, we were able to replicate the results of 
Ashton et al. (2003) in respect of tournament final matches’ draws and losses. These 
are presented in tables 1 and 2, while tables 3 and 4 reflect the new results after the 
distortions had been corrected.  
As illustrated in table 1, Ashton et al. (2003) indicate that all games have a positive 
mean return after a win and a negative mean return after a defeat. When comparing 
these results with ours (table 3), the difference becomes evident. In our study, the 
mean returns after losses are considerably less negative or even positive. This effect 
is also evident with regard to wins, which become less positive. The results are even 
positive in games that end in a draw, with the exception of tournament finals.  
We also tested the significance of our results and found that compared to the Ashton 
et al. (2003) study, the statistical significance had changed tremendously. In 
duplicating these authors’ study, we used binomial statistics to test whether the 
expected return on the next day’s2 trading was greater (or less) than the unconditional 
mean return after a win (or loss) by considering what proportion of returns after a 
particular game outcome exceeded the unconditional mean return. In the original 
study (table 2), all mean returns after a loss are significant on a 5% or better level. In 
our study (table 4), only one result is significant on a 5% significance level. We also 
find no significant results in respect of a win, as demonstrated in table 2.  
It is important to note that in both studies significant results are not independent of 
one another: “tournament final games” are, of course, a subgroup of “tournament 
finals and qualifying games.” Further, it is evident that the significant results of 
“tournament finals games” are the only reason why the larger sample is significant. 
                                                 
2
 Or the same trading day, depending on the time of the event. 
Page 8 of 22
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 9 
Ultimately, we could therefore not support Ashton and colleagues’ conclusion that 
there is a “statistically significant relationship between the performance of the 
English national soccer team and the change in the price of shares traded on the 
London stock exchange” (Ashton et al., 2003, p. 785). The only appropriate 
significant results seem to be the stock market reactions after the English soccer team 
suffered losses in tournament finals. This result is astonishing insofar as we doubt 
that soccer fans are equipped with large short-selling capacities, since this instrument 
is not much used by private investors and was certainly not available some years ago.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  
Another interesting finding is that even small variations or mistakes in the data set 
can have a huge impact on the results of an event study. After notifying Ashton and 
colleagues of our findings, they obtained almost the same results using the suggested 
corrections. However, there was still an asymmetry between the two studies 
concerning the time at which the return should be measured. In their study, the 
authors always use the next available trading day, whereas in our study, if the game 
results were known during stock exchange trading hours, that day was used rather 
than the following day. We therefore computed a mean return of 0.0186% in respect 
of the thirteen wins in tournament finals (see table 3), whereas Ashton et al. (2003) 
computed 0.1795%3. We could then replicate their results by employing different 
returns in respect of two of the 13 matches - those held on June 7, 2002 and June 15, 
1998.  
                                                 
3
 Ashton et al. provided us with the result of one game corrected in respect of the “copy and paste” 
effect. 
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The first game (June 7, 2002) was the world championship in Sapporo, Japan where 
the English team defeated Argentina (1:0). Since, the kickoff was at 8:30 pm Japan 
time, the result was known during the London Stock Exchange trading hours on the 
day of the game (Friday at about 2.15 pm GMT). We therefore took a return of -
0.750964% to compute the average. Ashton et al. used the return of the following 
trading day (0.158727%), which was a Monday, to compute their average. On the 
second date (June 15, 1998), the game in Marseille kicked-off at 2:30 pm local time 
on a Monday. Hence, the result was known at the London Stock Exchange that same 
day (approximately 3.15 pm). Consequently, we used that return (-0.937641%). 
Ashton et al. (2003), however, used the return (0.244939%) of the next day, Tuesday, 
to compute their average.  
Which of the two standpoints is the correct one is not relevant in this case, but this 
example does indicate how sensitive, and therefore easy to influence, such results 
are, especially when sample sizes are very small.  
 
3 Robustness Checks 
In the following section, we address the problem of data mining that make robustness 
checks essential. We discuss a variety of possible robustness checks and, by means 
of the study by Ashton et al. (2003), demonstrate how formerly significant results 
disappear when robustness checks are applied.   
Using large financial databanks makes research much easier for investigators. 
However, they also run the risk of finding significant correlations between variables 
that are no more than a statistical fluke. Moreover, it is known that papers with 
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significant effects are much more likely to be published; an effect also known as the 
“file-drawer bias.” 4  
To avoid reporting significant but wholly spurious correlations, sophisticated 
researchers apply robustness checks to their results to counter the data-mining 
argument. 
 
3.1 Sub-Samples 
An easy way to check the robustness of empirical results is to divide the entire 
sample into sub-periods, Sub-period make it possible to check if the discovered 
correlations are stable over time. If they are not, there are two possible explanations:  
1. For some reason, the correlation regime has changed over time. This may be due 
to structural changes, behavioral changes, or something else. Whatever the reason, 
the authors have to find a logical economic explanation for these changes.  
2. The correlations are pure coincidence. 
We divided the entire Ashton et al. (2003) sample into two sub-periods to check the 
robustness of the empirical results. The first sub-sample includes the period 1984 to 
1993, the second the one 1994 to 2002. In the corrected results (table 4), a significant 
relationship is found between games lost and the FTSE returns on the following 
trading day.  
Table 5 presents the results of this robustness check. There are (still) significant 
results in the first sub-sample: an English soccer team defeat produces a FTSE stock 
market return that is below the average FTSE return. Please note that “tournament 
finals games” is a sub-sample of “tournament finals and qualifying games” – the 
significant results of “tournament finals games” are the only reason why the larger 
sample is significant. In the second sub-sample (1994–2002), the significance does 
                                                 
4
 See McQueen et al. (1997), p. 69. 
Page 11 of 22
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 12 
not only disappear, the effect is also reversed: there are more days with a higher than 
average return after a game ending in defeat than days with a lower return. Since 
there is no logical explanation for this finding, we attribute the first sample’s 
significant results to pure coincidence. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
3.2 Outliers   
A common characteristic associated with financial time series like stock market 
series is the presence of extreme observations. Consequently, statistics derived from 
financial data sets include outliers and is often misleading. This is a real problem 
when computing OLS regressions or – like Ashton et al. (2003) did – calculating 
means. A common approach to check for the influence of outliers is to eliminate the 
extreme quantiles (e.g., the 1% quantiles) of the observations. 
Table 6 is thus similar in structure to table 3, but the largest and smallest returns were 
eliminated when the average mean returns were computed. It becomes clear that the 
mean return after a victory in a final turns negative, which is contrary to Ashton et 
al.’s (2003) perception. 
  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
3.3 Confounding Events, Seasonal Effects, and Economic Relevance  
Additional robustness checks would be possible: We could check for confounding 
events, like ad-hoc announcements or changes in interest rates on the day of a soccer 
game. Furthermore, it might be logical to estimate and remove seasonal effects from 
the time series: discovered correlations may, after all, be attributable to business 
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cycles or calendar anomalies. In addition, criticism in respect of data snooping could 
be avoided by studying out-of-sample data.  
 
Finally, even if there were a relationship between soccer results and stock market 
outcomes, there is still one unanswered question: so what? 
From a theoretical point of view, such a finding would challenge the efficient market 
hypothesis. We call financial markets “efficient” if they don’t allow investors to earn 
above-average, risk-adjusted returns. From a practical point of view, investors could 
be interested in such a finding if this knowledge were to allow them to earn money. 
Whatever the case, empirical researchers would need to find a trading strategy in 
order to generate abnormal returns on the basis of a discovered anomaly. We doubt 
that this is possible, even if trading costs were not taken into account. 
We do not see the necessity of doing additional checks on the Ashton et al. (2003) 
study. In our opinion, we have already supplied sufficient evidence that there is no 
link between England’s national soccer team’s achievements and the British FTSE 
100 index. 
 
4 Conclusions 
The aim of this study was twofold. Primarily, we wanted to point out some errors in 
previous empirical studies. By means of a replication study, it was demonstrated that 
even small mistakes could have a strong influence on empirical studies results. 
Consequently, the importance of replication studies was illustrated.  
In our opinion, replication studies have two predominant effects: first, they evaluate 
the set-up of the original empirical study and find possible mistakes – as we did in 
respect of the Ashton et al. (2003) paper. Second, by using new (independent) data, it 
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is possible to rule out the occurrence of a statistical Type I5 error in the original 
empirical study. Marquering et al. (2006), for example, examined several well-
known stock market anomalies before and after publication. They demonstrate that 
most of the effects disappeared after publication, or may never have existed at all. 
The problem with these kinds of papers is that they culminate in non-significant 
results, which are rather difficult to have published.  
In general, studies on market anomalies are always prone to the accusation of “data 
mining,” i.e. searching for coincidently significant results in large data sets. If data 
sets are large enough and contain many variables, it is obvious that significant 
(although useless) interrelations can sometimes be found by sheer coincidence. This 
can be a problem, as “publication bias” (or the “file-drawer problem”), known from 
medical publications, also plays an important role in economics. Studies with 
significant results are therefore more likely to be published; conversely, studies 
without such results are not publishable and are ignored. However, the efficiency of 
capital markets can never be proven significantly, only their failure can. One can 
only hope that the reputation of replication studies, as well as studies without 
significant results will improve in future. 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Lindgren (1993), p. 308 for a description.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics (Ashton et al., 2003) 
 Number of games Mean return after win 
(No. of wins) 
Mean return after 
draw (No. of draws) 
Mean return after loss 
(No. of losses) 
The FTSE 100 index: Period of Investigation 6 January 1984-3 July 2002 
Unconditional Daily Return on the index 0.03511% 
All internationals 210 0.1705% (102) -0.000481% (70) -0.1289% (38) 
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
99 0.3085% (49) -0.1843% (33) -0.1863% (17) 
Tournament finals games 35 0.2698% (12) -0.2129% (11) -0.4150% (12) 
 
The table shows the results of Ashton et al. (2003). “Tournament finals games” are all games of international tournaments of the 
English national soccer team. For “Tournament finals and qualifying games” qualifying competitions for 
major international tournament are added. “All internationals” include all types of international soccer games of the English  
national soccer team, including non-tournament ‘friendly’ matches.  
Ashton et al compute positive mean returns of the FTSE 100 index after wins and negative mean returns after losses.  
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Table 2 
 Binomial Statistics (Ashton et al., 2003) 
 No. of returns after a win/loss which are >/≤ the 
unconditional mean. (Total no. of wins/losses) 
 
No. of games played 
Win Loss 
All internationals 210 50 (102) 27*** (38) 
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
99 30* (49) 13** (17) 
Tournament finals games 35 8 (12) 9** (11) 
 
This table presents the binomial statistics of Ashton et al. (2003). The intuition in column “win” is that the average return for 
the index after a win is greater than the unconditional mean return. The number in brackets is the number of won games of the 
English team, the number without brackets is the amount of cases where the average return for the index after a win is greater 
than the unconditional mean return. 
In column “loss” they test whether the average return for the FTSE 100 index after a loss of the national soccer team is 
significantly less than the unconditional mean return for all types of matches.  
For instance, the English soccer team has lost 38 games, the FTSE 100 index has fallen by an amount greater than the 
unconditional mean return on 27 of these occasions.  
 
*, **, ***  indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, resp. 
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Table 3 
 Descriptive Statistics (corrected) 
 Number of games Mean return after win 
(No. of wins) 
Mean return after 
draw (No. of draws) 
Mean return after loss 
(No. of losses) 
The FTSE 100 index: Period of Investigation 6 January 1984-3 July 2002 
Unconditional Daily Return on the index 0.03655% 
All internationals 210 0.1126% (103) 0.0512% (65) 0.0069% (42) 
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
97 0.1424 % (48) 0.1634% (29) -0.0420% (20) 
Tournament finals games 35 0.0186% (13) -0.5244 % (8) -0.1870% (14) 
 
The table shows our corrected the results and is organized like table 1. “Tournament finals games” are all games of international 
tournaments of the English national soccer team. For “Tournament finals and qualifying games” qualifying competitions for 
major international tournament are added. “All internationals” include all types of international soccer games of the English 
national soccer team, including non-tournament ‘friendly’ matches.  
Compared to Ashton et al. the mean returns after losses are considerably less negative or even positive. This effect is also 
visible for the wins, which become less positive. The results are even positive in games that end in a draw, with the exception of 
tournament finals. 
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Table 4 
 Binomial Statistics (corrected) 
 No. of returns after a win/loss which are >/≤ the 
unconditional mean. (Total no. of wins/losses) 
 
No. of games played 
Win Loss 
All internationals 210 51 (103) 24  (42) 
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
97 25 (48) 13* (20) 
Tournament finals games 35 5 (13) 10** (14) 
 
This table presents our corrected binomial statistics of Ashton et al. (2003). Like in table 2 the intuition in column “win” is that 
the average return for the index after a win is greater than the unconditional mean return. The number in brackets is the number 
of won games of the English team, the number without brackets is the amount of cases where the average return for the index 
after a win is greater than the unconditional mean return. 
In column “loss” they test whether the average return for the FTSE 100 index after a loss by the national soccer team is 
significantly less than the unconditional mean return for all types of matches.  
In truth the English soccer team has lost 42 games, the FTSE 100 index has fallen by an amount greater than the unconditional 
mean return on 24 of these occasions.  
 
*, **, ***  indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, resp. 
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Table 5 
 Sub Samples. Binomial Statistics 
 No. of returns after a win/loss which are >/≤ the 
unconditional mean. (Total no. of wins/losses) 
 
No. of games played 
Win Loss 
Sub-Period 1984 - 1993    
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
54 13 (25) 9***(10) 
Tournament finals games  18 2 (5) 8*** (8) 
Sub-Period 1994 – 2002    
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
43 12 (23) 4 (10) 
Tournament finals games  17 3 (8) 2 (6) 
To check the robustness of the (corrected) results we split the sample in two sub samples. When comparing these results to the 
results of table 4  it can be seen that the significance can be explained by the first sub sample – the effect reverses in the second 
subsample.  
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Table 6 
 Descriptive Statistics without extreme values (i.e. highest and lowest return) 
 Number of games Mean return after win 
(No. of wins) 
Mean return after 
draw (No. of draws) 
Mean return after loss 
(No. of losses) 
The FTSE 100 index: Period of Investigation 6 January 1984-3 July 2002 
Unconditional Daily Return on the index 0.03655% 
Tournament finals and 
qualifying games 
91 0.1105 (46) 0.0809 (27) -0.1303% (18) 
Tournament finals games 29 -0.1258% (11) -0.5402 % (6) -0.2286% (12) 
We check the robustness of the (corrected) results of table 3 with removing the largest and the smallest value of the returns. In 
one out of six cases the algebraic sign changes.  
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